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FEDERAL rent control, under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947,1 is
scheduled to terminate February 29, 1948. The date seems likely to
be extended, but federal regulation will eventually come to an end.
The housing shortage, however, will certainly endure for some period
to come, at least in parts of the country.2 A measure of continued
control will probably be called for, and it will be to state and local
governments that tenants will look.3
As of the end of the 1947 legislative sessions, 4 only ten states had
enacted rent control laws.5 Rent control bills were introduced in four-
teen other states,6 but in most cases they never got out of committee.
The Indiana bill passed one house; the Vermont bill passed both, but
the two houses were unable to compose their differences and the bill
failed of final enactment. Whether any further state legislation will
be enacted in 1948 depends chiefly on the expiration date of the federal
' Member of the California Bar and of the Bars of the United States Supreme Court
and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
1. Pub. L. No. 129, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 30, 1947) (cited hereinafter as the
Housing and Rent Act of 1947). See Willis, Tite Fcderal Housing and Rent Act of
1947, 47 Cor. L. REv. 1118 (1947).
2. "Unless basic flaws are corrected in the building industry America seems sta-
tistically certain to be still ill-housed when 1957 rolls around." Wall Street Journal,
Oct. 9, 1947, p. 1, col. 6. There was a serious housing shortage as early as 1939. See Note,
50 YALE L. 3. 176 (1940).
3. Some cities have already enacted ordinances to implement or fill interstices in the
federal law, or to continue control upon its demise. E.g., New York City Local Laws
No. 54, 66, 67, 68, Admin. Code §§ U41-6.0 to U41-9.0 (1947); Chicago, Ordinance of
July 25, 1947; Philadelphia, Ordinance of August 13, 1947; Los Angeles, Ordinances
No. 91,961, 92,334 (1947); San Francisco, Ordinance No. 4534 (1947). Discussion of
these ordinances is beyond the scope of this article.
4. Forty-four states had regular sessions in 1947. Virginia had a special session,
see note 5 infra. So also did Louisiana, but it was limited to appropriation measures.
5. Conn. Acts 1947, No. 394; IL. STAT. ANN., c. 80 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1947);
La. Acts 1946, No. 333; Md. Laws 1947, c. 507; Minn. Laws 1947, c. 632; Mo. Rv.
STAT. §§ 3015.1-.12 (Supp. 1947); N. J. Laws 1946, c. 319, extended by 1947, c. 46;
N. Y. Laws 1946, c. 274, reenacted by 1947, c. 704; Va. Laws Spec. Sess. 1947, c. 63;
Wis. STAT. § 234.26 (Supp. 1947). Michigan and Rhode Island enacted emergency rent con-
trol laws during the "OPA holiday" of July, 1946. Mich. Acts 2d Spec. Sess. 1946, No. 1;
R. I. Laws 1946, c. 1814. These laws expired in 1946 and the Michigan law was, for good
measure, repealed by Mfich. Laws 1947, c. 129.
MfR. REv. STAT., c. 124, § 41 (1944) (derived from fe. Laws 1919, c. 256) prohibits
landlords from demanding or collecting "an unreasonable or unjust rent or charge, taking
into due consideration the actual market value of the property at the time, with a fair
return thereon... !'
6. California, Colorado, Delaware, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia.
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act, since only nine states have regular sessions this year and three of
them already have rent laws.7 If the federal Act is. extended through
1948 there will be no necessity for other states to enact laws on the
subject, at least until 1949; and, except in Wisconsin, only the threat
of an untimely ending of federal controls has so far induced state legis-
lators to consider the matter at all.
Rent control in the period after World War I was entirely on a local
basis,8 and, in its first tentative incursion into the field in the World
War II period, the federal government took the position that state
and local control was preferable, and the national government should
do no more than give counsel and advice.' A model state law drafted
by the Consumer Division of the National Defense Advisory Commis-
sion,10 however, was almost universally ignored; only Virginia enacted
such a law, and it was never called into effect." Congress in the Emer-
gency Price Control Adt,'12 nevertheless leaned over backnvard to allow
state and local governments the first opportunity to stabilize rents.
Section 2(b) of that Act provided that before the Price Administrator
could establish rent controls in any area, he should first issue "a declara-
tion setting forth the necessity for, and recommendations with reference
to, the stabilization or reduction of rents" within the area. Federal
control could not become effective unless after sixty days rents for such
accommodations had not in the Administrator's judgment been stab-
ilized or reduced by state or local regulation, or otherwise, in accordance
with his recommendations. 3 By October, 1942, the entire continental
United States and some outlying possessions had been designated as
defense-rental areas. But only a handful of cities, mostly small, en-
acted legislation for the stabilization of rents, and in only two of these,
7. New York, New Jersey and Virginia. The other states are Kentucky, Louisiana
(session starts in May), Massachusetts, Mississippi, Rhode Island and South Carolina.
8. U.S. HOUSING CowoaRATIoN REPORT 29 (1920).
9. NATIONAL DExrNsE ADVISORY COMMISSION, CONSUMER DmsioN, BULL. No, 7,
9-10 (Jan. 7, 1941) ; BumL. No. 10 (March 15, 1941).
By 1945, however, the OPA could say that "if .. . war-time rent control is to be
effective, reasonable rentals must necessarily be determined by centralized authority,"
relying on Village Apartment Homes, Inc. v. Bowles, 149 F.2d 649 (E.C.A. 1945), which
does not support the quoted Statement. City of Dallas, 3 Pinc & FiscnER AD. LAW 3194
(OPA Op. & Dec. 1945). See also OPA, FRsT QuARTRLY REp. 48, 51 (1942).
10. BULL. No. 10, op. cit. mupra note 9.
11. VA. CODE ANN. §2673(163)-(179)(Michie, 1942). This law expired by its
terms in 1944. It was based on a variation of the N.D.A.C. bill, prepared by the NA-
TiONAL INSTITUTE OF MUNIcIPAL LAW OFFcERs, REPORT No. 70 (March, 1941).
A draft bill prepared by the Citizens' Housing Council of New York was introduced
in the New York legislature in 1940, Senate Int. No. 2111, but given no consideration.
For a discussion of this bill see Note, 50 YALE L.J. 176 (1940).
12. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. 1946).
13. See 18 Palmer Avenue, Inc. v. Porter, 157 F.2d 595 (E.C.A. 1946).
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so far as is known, was the local action deemed sufficient to keep OPA
out of the picture.'
4
Except for the Wisconsin law, all of the statutes here under discus-
sion were enacted prior to the signing of the Housing and Rent Act of
1947 and in anticipation of the possible termination of federal regula-
tion. The New York act was passed, with admirable foresight, in
March, 1946, and prevented a hiatus in rent control in that state during
the "OPA holiday" of July, 1946.15 The New Jersey statute was en-
acted during the "holiday", although it had been in effect only four
days when the OPA regulations were revived. 0 The Louisiana act was
also a product of this interim period, and shows it in its poor drafts-
manship. The other six statutes were formulated during the first part
of 1947, when the new federal act was itself still in the process of enact-
14. Flint, Mich. and Honolulu, Hawaii. See Flint, Ordinance No. 509 (1942);
Honolulu, Ordinance No. 941 (1941).
Ordinances enacted in Neosho, Mo.; Eugene, Bend and Salem, Ore., were super-
seded by OPA controls. Neosho, Ordinance No. 33 (1942); Eugene, Ordinance No.
8800 (1944); Bend, Ordinance No. 315 (1943); Salem, Ordinance Nos. 3609 (1943),
3713 (1946). Fresno, Calif., Ordinance No. 2859 ,vas held unconstitutional in Peregoy
v. City of Fresno, Civil No. 65,185 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1944) and OPA regulation was
subsequently introduced in the area.
Australia at first attempted to leave rent control to the states because "it was felt
that they would be able to exercise the more effective control." DEPr. or TrAz Aim
CusToMs, PsucE CONunOL uxDEa Tn NATiONAL Swuarunn Act 1939-1940 22 (1940).
After the change of government in 1941, federal control of evictions was brought into
effect in all states, and control of rents in all states except Western Australia and South
Australia, which retained their own legislation. At the Premiers' Conference in August,
1946, it was decided to continue rent control on a basis of Commonwealth and complemen-
tary state legislation, and such legislation was enacted in all states; but at least one of these
acts has expired, and it is doubted whether adequate complementary legislation will be
forthcoming in the future. For this reason, and because of doubts as to the constitutionality
of further Commonwealth control of rents, the Australian Parliament recently enacted the
Constitution Alteration (Rents and Prices) Act, under which a referendum will be held
(probably in May, 1948) on whether the Commonwealth Parliament should be vested with
permanent power over rents and prices. Speech of the Hon. Nelson Lemmon, Minister of
Works and Housing, in the Australian Parliament, Nov. 27, 1947.
Canadian rent control has been carried out by the Dominion Government from the
outset, and there are no plans even yet to turn control over to the provinces. Letter
from Owen Lobley, Rentals Administrator, Sept. 24, 1947.
Under the Swiss federal system regulation had to be left to the cantons, but the
Federal Council adopted a model law, ArrWt de Conseil Fddral, Oct. 15, 1941. See also
INTEmATiONAL LAoR ORGA-NIATION, EuRoPEAN HousrNG Pronmns 223 (1923). A gold
deal of authority was originally delegated to the states in Germany, but in 1922 the sys-
tem was federalized. Id. at 324-6.
15. See Sanders v. Kibrick Realty Corp., 117 N.Y.UJ. 393 (N.Y. City CL 1947);
Tm poRARY STATE HousinG RnxT Com!nussrxN Rzronr (1946); Message of Go. Dewey,
N.Y. LEris. Doc. No. 1 at 13-4 (1947).
16. The act was superseded by the Price Control Extension Act of 1946 on July 26,
1946 (see § 5 thereof) and its operation was formally suspended on July 30 by proclama-
tion of Gov. Edge.
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ment, although some of them were not signed'until after that act had
become law. Because of this background, the state statutes in some
respects are not well integrated with the federal law and, if they are
not amended, ambiguities and difficulties may arise if and when the
state laws go into effect.
APPLICATION OF THE LAWS
Again except for the Wisconsin statute, none of the laws under con-
sideration is intended to take effect as long as federal controls are in
force. The New York act originally provided in Section 11(1) that
"The establishment of a rent control area and the establishment of
maximum rents therein and of regulations and orders relating
thereto shall not be or become operative as long as rent control
therein established by the federal price administrator pursuant to
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 as amended, or other duly
authorized officer or agency of the United States pursuant to any
federal law, is in force and effect."
In spite of the use of the phrase "as long as rent control therein . . . is
in force and effect," the Attorney General of New York ruled that the
act could not be brought into force, even in an area of the state which
was not under federal regulation, as long as federal rent control was
being maintained anywhere in the state."7 The 1947 legislature con-
firmed this construction by striking out the second "therein" and add-
ing the words
"whether or not by the terms of such federal act or law or by admin-
istrative regulation or order, it is limited or confined to or excepts
any rent control area or other area or region, or any type, category
or other classification of housing accommodations heretofore or
hereafter subjected to control of rents, or housing accommodations
heretofore or hereafter constructed." 18
The wisdom of such self-denial is not apparent. Probably it is well
enough not to have one area of the state under federal control and an-
other under state control-although even this limitation might result
in blocking needed action if, for example, a disaster wiped out a large
percentage of the housing in some community not subject to federal
17. Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y., Dec. 12, 1946.
18. An amendment to permit the state law to go into effect as soon as the federal
government relinquished control of any area or class of housing was defeated. 2 N. Y.
SEN. J. 1771-2 (1947).
For a logomachy as to whether the amended clause would prevent the state law
from being brought into effect in the inconceivable contingency of federal controls being
abolished in New York State while retained in some other state, see Letter from John
J. Lamula, New York Times, July 22, 1947, p. 22; Letter from Assemblyman Richard
M. Goldwater, Id., July 30, 1947, p. 20.
[Vol. 57: $51
1948] STATE RENT-CONTROL LEGISLATION, 1946-1947 355
regulation." Why, however, the legislature in March, 1947, should
have been so willing to accept in advance the exemption of "any type,
category or other classification of housing accommodations" which
Congress might thereafter agree on, is curious. The clause is poorly
phrased, also, in its reference to types or categories of accommodations
"heretofore or hereafter subjected to control of rents." What of accom-
modations never subjected to control, such as resort housing? :3
The Illinois act is identical with the original version of the New York
legislation; the Connecticut, Maryland and Minnesota statutes are in
substance the same. Missouri provides that "This act shall become
effective at the expiration of the federal law relating to rent control, or
shall be effective when the federal law permits state rent control regula-
tion to supersede federal control .... ,, 21 The Indiana bill, as amended
in the Senate, contained a startling variation on this idea: county, city
and town governing bodies could have been empowered to create rent
control commissions, but not until six months had elapsed after e.xpi-
ration or repeal of the federal law.22 The New Jersey and Virginia acts
are silent on the question, but New Jersey's governor has held that
the state law cannot be brought into effect as long as federal controls
remain in force,2 3 and Virginia's chief executive has made no move to
put that statute into effect.
The bill to continue federal rent control, as passed by the Senate in
May, 1947, contained a provision authorizing states to take over rent
control upon certification by the governor that a state rent control
statute had been enacted. 24 The clause was stricken out in conference.
Even if it had been retained, it would have had little effect, because
under an amendment proposed by Senator Ives and adopted by the
Senate the state statute would have had to show affirmatively that it
was intended to replace federal control. None of them does make
such a showing; indeed they show the contrary, with the possible ex-
ception of Missouri, and certainly with the exception of the Wisconsin
act, which was not passed until the federal law had been signed, and
which expressly applies during the time that federal control remains
in effect, as well as afterwardY
19. Federal control cannot be extended to any areas not under control on March 1,
1947. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 202(d).
20. See p. 361 infra.
21. Mo. REv. STAT. §3015.12 (Supp. 1947).
22. Indiana, S.B. 231, as amended, § 3 (1947).
23. New York Times, July 4, 1947, p. 8, col. 4.
24. S. 1017, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 5. The House voted dovm an amendment to
the same effect. 93 Cong. Rec. 4541 (May 1, 1947).
25. See 93 Cong. Rec. 6196 (May 29, 1947).
26. The Wisconsin act of course adopts federal rent ceilings while they remain in
effect. To the extent that it goes beyond the federal law with respect to evictions there
may be some question as to its validity. See p. 372 infra.
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All of the laws are temporary in nature, with expiration dates rang-
ing from June 30, 1948 to June 30, 1949Y
ACCOMMODATIONS COVERED
The acts are all limited to residential accommodations, however this
is defined; only New York and Hawaii have regulated business and
commercial rents, and discussion of such statutes is beyond the scope
of the present article. 28 The Missouri law applies only to "apartments",
which it defines as "any room or group of adjoining or connected rooms
within any building which is occupied or intended to be occupied by
one or more individuals as a residence, house, sleeping or lodging place
* ." Whether this was meant to be limited to dwelling units in mul-
tiple-family buildings, or whether it would cover single-family dwelling
houses as well, is not clear from the context. The former interpretation
might raise a question as to the constitutionality of the act, on the
theory that it unreasonably discriminates against owners of apartment
buildings, unless the courts could find that the legislature had some
reasonable basis for supposing that control was needed only as to apart-
ments. Whether constitutional or not, limiting control to apartments
would certainly seem to be undesirable from a practical standpoint.
Except for certain hotel accommodations, the Wisconsin statute ex-
pressly applies only to housing for which a maximum rent, established
under federal law, was "in effect on the last day said federal rent control
law was in effect." 29 The Minnesota law seems susceptible of the same
interpretation, since it provides that rents in effect in defense-rental
areas in the state pursuant to federal regulation on the last day of federal
control shall become the maximum rents."0 The New Jersey statute is
similar, 31 and the New York law has been given the same construction, 2
although for less substantial reasons. 3 The chief results of such a limi-
27. New York, New Jersey, Missouri, June 30, 1948 (this although Missouri has
no regular session in 1948) ; Virginia, July 1, 1948; Minnesota, Jan. 15, 1949; Wisconsin,
April 1, 1949; Maryland, June 1, 1949; Illinois, June 30, 1949; Connecticut, upon ad-
journment of the 1949 session sine die; Louisiana, upon adjournment of the 1948 session.
28. See Stephens, Statutory Controls over Commercial Rents, 17 N.Y. STAT BAR.
Ass'N BULL. 151 (1945) ; Note, 19 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 179 (1945); Note, 21 N.Y.U.L.Q.
REv. 427 (1946). The Hawaiian statute is Acts of 1945, No. 69.
29. Query as to the meaning of "in effect" as applied to maximum rents; would the
clause cover, e.g., accommodations which had previously been registered with OPA, but
which at the time federal controls lapsed were owner-occupied?
30. Minn. Laws, 1947, c. 632, § 4. See also § 8, providing that "No maxinnunt rent
for any housing accommodation in any rent control area shall be increased ... except
as provided for in this act. . . ." Section 4 is the only section providing for fixing of
maximum rents.
31. N. J. Laws, 1946, c. 319, § 4. This section refers to rents in effect on June 30,
1946. But compare § 9 of the statute, summarized p. 358 infra.
32. See p. 361 infra.
33. The New York act nowhere limits control to federally-controlled housing, and
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tation would be to exempt from state control: all hotel accommoda-
tions, whether transient or permanent in nature; 14 all new construction
completed on or after February 1, 1947; 31 "additional housing accom-
modations created by conversion on or after February 1, 1947"; " ac-
commodations not rented as housing accommodations at any time be-
tween February 1, 1945 and January 31, 1947; 3 accommodations not
rented at any time while federal controls were in effect. Some of these
exceptions, as we shall see, are written expressly into the state laws.
In addition, however, such a restriction on the scope of the state
statutes may have an unexpected effect. The federal act provides that
if a lease is made providing for a "voluntary" increase of rent up to
15%, as authorized in the proviso to §204(b), the accommodation in
question shall not "be subject, after December 31, 1947, to any maxi-
mum rent established or maintained under the provisions of this title."IS
The purpose of the clause is not clear, but it has been construed as mean-
ing that after December 31 there is no maximum rent on the premises
but that the lease alone controls. If this construction is followed it is
obvious that accommodations subject to such a lease will have no max-
imum rent on the date that federal controls terminate, and hence will
not be subject to any restriction-after expiration or cancellation of
the lease-in states such as Wisconsin, Minnesota, New Jersey and
perhaps New York. 9 If there is any rational basis for this discrimina-
tory classification, it is difficult to discern. It may be subject to chal-
lenge as denying tenants of such uncontrolled units the equal protection
of the laws; in any event, it should be avoided by more careful drafts-
manship of the state legislation. a
while federal ceilings are to be retained so far as practicable, see p. 366 infra, there is
nothing in the act to prevent accommodations not under federal rent ceilings from being
brought under state control.
34. See p. 359 infra.
35. See p. 358 infra.
36. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, §202(c)(3) (A). Housing converted after
termiination of the federal act would probably be exempt from control, if state control
were limited to accommodations governed by the federal law, on the theory that after
conversion they were not the same accommodations as those to which the federal ceilings
applied. Delsnider v. Gould, 154 F2d 844 (App. D.C. 1946).
37. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 202(c) (3) (B).
38. Id., § 204(b). See Willis, supra note 1, at 1132-3.
39. See New York Times, Nov. 6, 1947, p. 29, col. 1, quoting unidentified "rent ex-
perts" as saying that accommodations subject to leases of this sort "would not be brought
back under ceilings again, even when the state rent law became effective." But ci. New
York Times, Jan. 7, 1948, p. 27, col. 5 (indicating that the state law may be amended to
provide a measure of control over such accommodations.)
As of Nov. 1, the percentage of housing accommodations subject to control which
had come under such leases was U. in New York State, 10.5 in New Jersey, 14.9 in Miz-
nesota and 20.4 in Wisconsin. U. S. Office of Housing Expediter, Press Release No.
930, Nov. 10, 1947.
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NEW CONSTRUCTION
One subject on which the acts under consideration are almost unani-
mous is the exemption of new construction. In this they follow the
lead of the New York Business and Commercial Rent Laws,40 and the
earlier New York housing laws of the 1920's,41 and are in line with the
federal act, which exempts accommodations "the construction of which
was completed on or after February 1, 1947, or which are additional
housing accommodations created by conversion on or after February
1, 1947." 42 The statutes vary somewhat in their terms, but all achieve
about the same end. The New York and Illinois acts exempt buildings
completed on or after rent control becomes operative in the area; in
Connecticut the determinative date is the date of passage of the act.
Virginia excepts construction begun after January 1, 1947; Missouri,
construction completed after that date. The New Jersey statute takes
a different tack; what it apparently means is that the owner of newly
constructed housing may set his own "first rent", but that after he has
done so he may not raise it, nor may he evict the tenant except in ac-
cordance with the act and regulations.
43
The Minnesota legislators attempted to copy an earlier draft of the
federal act which exempted "any accommodations construction of
which commenced on or after February 1, 1947," but by an apparent
slip of the pen the phrase came out "on or before February 1, 1947,"
which renders it meaningless, unless it be interpreted to mean "com-
menced on or before February 1, 1947 and completed thereafter." 11
The act also excepts, as does the federal law, "additional housing
accommodations created by conversion on or after February 1, 1947,"
it being the only state statute to do so in terms, 45 although the Virginia
act contains a rather cryptic exemption of "any habitable building, no
part of which has been used for dwelling purposes prior to the conven-
ing of the legislative session at which this act is adopted."
Exemptions of this sort are of course motivated by the belief that
rent control impedes building activity and that excepting new housing
from control will remove the impediment. 4 Unfortunately, however,
exemption of new construction is almost certain to result in a wide
40. N. Y. Laws 1946, cc. 272-3, amending N. Y. Laws, 1945 cc. 3 and 314 respectively.
See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study Rents, N.Y. LEGis. Doe. No. 46 at
13 (1946).
41. N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 944, § 10. See also Willis, supra note 1, at 1122.
42. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 202(c) (3) (A).
43. N. J. Laws 1946, c. 319, § 9.
44. Accommodations completed after February 1, 1947 will not be subject to the
Minnesota law in any event, see p. 356 supra.
45. See note 36 supra.
46. See, e.g., H. REP. No. 317, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-4 (1947) ; SEN. REP. No. 86,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947); Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study
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disparity between uncontrolled rents of new housing and controlled
rents of old housing.
41
HOTELS
There is less unanimity on the question whether hotel rents should
be controlled. The Housing and Rent Act ended federal rent control
over all hotel accommodations, permanent as well as transient. 4 In
removing protection from permanent occupants the act probably went
too far, and city councils in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles and
several other cities have reimposed controls, although usually allowing
a percentage increase over June 30 levels.3 The Wisconsin statute,
which was passed after the enactment of the federal law, also applies
by its terms to rents charged permanent guests in hotels, although not
to "hotel accommodations for transient guests." 9 New York and
New Jersey expressly include hotels in the definition of "housing ac-
commodations" or "housing space". The Illinois, Maryland and Mis-
souri laws, on the other hand, expressly do not apply to hotels, and
the Minnesota statute, patterned after an early version of the federal
act, exempts "any accommodations which consist of, or are located in,
any transient hotel, residential hotel, tourist home, or motor court."
The Connecticut act is noncommittal on the point, although it seems
broad enough to cover hotels; -' the Virginia act includes hotels in the
definition of "dwelling", but then provides that rent control under the
act shall not apply to hotels "beyond the extent that Federal rent con-
trol was actually in force therein on the day before the aforesaid Federal
rent control laws and applicable regulations shall have expired," which
of course means that they will not be covered at all.
As a practical matter, states other than Wisconsin will probably not
attempt to regulate hotel rents even where the legislation permits it,
Rents, N.Y. LEGis. Doc. No. 46 at 13 (1946); Message of Gov. Dewey, N.Y. Lrzis. Dc.
No. 1 at 14 (1947) ; Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Rent Control, Cmd.
6621, p. 10 (London, 1945).
47. According to "a survey by federal housing officials," rents of new construction
decontrolled by the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 average 60 to 70% above controlled
rents of comparable older units. Washington Daily News, Nov. 28, 1947, p. 46. In foreign
countries, the disparity is sometimes 200 or 300%. Helm, Mexico, Atlantic Monthly, July,
1946, p. 137. ExmAssy REIoRT No. 105, Mexico, D.F., Feb. 4, 1946; Hamburger Frem-
denblatt (Budapest, Dec. 16, 1943).
48. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 202(c) (1)-(2).
49. See note 3 supra.
50. "Permanent guest" is defined as "Any person who has been an occupant of a
housing accommodation in a hotel continuously since January 1, 1947 and not on a day
rate basis." Wis. STAT. § 234.26(2) (g) (Supp. 1947).
51. "As used in this act, the term 'housing accommodation' shall mean any building or
part thereof occupied or suitable for occupancy as a place of abode. .. ." Conn. Acts,
1947, No. 394, § 1.
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Several statutes expressly exclude accommodations situated on a
farm. The Illinois legislators were so anxious to accomplish this result
that they repeated the exclusion three times over, although with slight
variations in language: first in the definition of "housing accommoda-
tion", again in the definition of "community" and finally in the section
on powers of the rent commissions. All three provisions in substance
exempt buildings or structures outside a city, village, or incorporated
town used primarily in connection with agricultural pursuits. The
Missouri law excepts "any residence on a farm which is occupied by any
person engaged in the operation of said farm." Minnesota exempts
"farm tenant houses, and dwellings situated on farm lands containing
25 acres or more." Wisconsin repeats the exemption, contained in the
OPA regulations and continued by the Housing Expediter 61 of "a
dwelling situated on a farm and occupied by a tenant who is engaged
for a substantial portion of his time in farming operations thereon,"
while the New Jersey statute in the same words directs the rent con-
trol commissioner to provide for such an exemption. These provisions
are sensible, for the principles applicable to control of urban rents are
not well adapted to farm housing, and there has been no demand for
regulation of such rents. Similar exemptions are found in many foreign
statutes,54 although agricultural rents are sometimes the subject of spe-
cial legislation.
OTHER EXCEPTIONS
The New York statute, as originally enacted, excepted from the
definition of "housing accommodations" "a hospital, convent, monas-
52. This may not be true where municipal control has bridged the gap, as in New
York City and Chicago, see p. 352 supra.
53. OPA Rent Regulation for Housing, § 1 (b) (1), 11 FED. REa. 12055 (1946). OHE
Controlled Housing Rent Regulation, § 1 (b) (1), 12 Fm. Rw. 4332 (1947).
54. See Great Britain: Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act,
1920, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 17, § 12(2) (iii) (house let together with land whose taxable
value let separately would exceed 3/4 taxable value of house, not covered); Rent and
Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. VI, c. 71, § 3(3) (house let with
agricultural land exceeding two acres in extent, not covered) ; Eire: Act No. 4 of 1946,
§ 3(2) (g); British Guiana: Ordinances of 1941, No. 23, § 3(4) (building let with agri-
cultural land, not covered) ; New Zealand: Fair Rents Act of 1936, § 2 (house let with
land other than site, garden or other premises in connection therewith, not covered) ;
Australia: National Security (Landlord and Tenant) Regulations, S.R. 1945, No. 97,
Reg. 8 ("the premises of any grazing area, farm, orchard, market garden, dairy farm,
poultry farm, pig farm or bee farm") ; Canada: Wartime Prices & Trade Board, Order
No. 294, § 2(1) (b), Order No. 315, § 2(1) (a) ; see also Morris v. Louw, S. Air. L. Rep.
[1939l C.P.D. 395 (farm, let with a farmhouse, is not a "dwelling").
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tery, asylum, public institution, or college or school dormitory." 55
This has been copied verbatim in Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Vir-
ginia, and Wisconsin; the Missouri statute is substantially identical.15
Connecticut and New Jersey make no such exemptions. The 1947
amendment to the New York law added a reference to "any institution
operated exclusively for charitable or educational purposes."
Minnesota's law exempts "resort property"; Wisconsin's, "dwelling
accommodations used for summer or winter resort purpose and cus-
tomarily rented or ocupied on a seasonal basis prior to the date this
section becomes operative." New Jersey provides for exemption of
"housing space rented, leased or subleased for seasonal use." Most
summer and winter resort housing wras exempt under the OPA regula-
tions, as it is under the regulations of the Housing Expediter." The
New York law does not in terms except resort housing, but since rents
will generally be fixed under the law on the basis of the maximum rents
under the federal law, it has been assumed that resort housing will for
the most part be left uncontrolled. This clearly is the intent of the
legislature. In two successive sessions, Democratic members sought to
bring summer resort housing under control, contending that rents had
risen exorbitantly and that the chief reason OPA had not extended
rent control to such housing was a lack of personnel and funds."S The
Republican majority of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study Rents
rejected the proposal, characterizing it as "frivolous", 9 and it was not
adopted. Whether the issue will be raised for a third time in 1948 is not
known. On the merits, it seems questionable whether the state is justi-
fied mi assuming the burden of policing rents of a purely "resort" nature.
The suggestion can scarcely be dismissed, however, as "frivolous".CP
The Minnesota law repeats the exemption, contained in the federal
act, 61 of "any accommodations which at no time during the period
55. This language was copied from the N.D.A.C. draft bill, op. cit. su-ra note 9, which
in turn took it from the draft bill prepared by the Citizens' Housing Council of New Yorl,
spra note 11.
56. The latter part of the exception in the Missouri act refers to any "public institu-
tion or college, college dormitory, dormitory operated by a non-profit corporation or or-
ganization. ."
57. OPA Rent Regulation for Housing, § 1(b) (6), 11 FED. REG. 12055 (1946). OHE
Controlled Housing Rent Regulation, § 1(b) (6), 12 FED. REG. 4332 (1947).
58. Reports of the Joint Legislative Committee to Study Rents, N.Y. LEMs. Doc. No.
46 at 16 (1946) ; N.Y. Lanis. Doc. No. 55 at 16-7 (1947) (minority views); Assembly
Int. Nos. 1649, 1856, 2385, 2650 (1946); Assembly Int. No. 905 (1947); see also Assembly
Int. Nos. 749, 1225 (1945).
59. N.Y. Lnris. D=c No. 46 at 15 (1946) ; N.Y. LEIs. Doc. No. 55 at 16-7 (1947).
60. See also the statement that "At their most divergent points the differences of the
Republican and Democratic members of the Committee represent the principles of free
enterprise upon which the success of our governmental system rests and the theory of col-
lectivism advocated by the disciples of Karl Marx." N.Y. LEcrs. Doc. No. 55 at 17 (1947).
61. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 202(c) (3) (B).
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February 1, 1945, to January 31, 1947, both dates inclusive, were rented
as housing accommodations." The purpose of this exception is to bring
back on the market accommodations withheld from renting because of
dissatisfaction with the rent ceilings that would be applicable, although
it has been criticized as discriminating in favor of landlords who held
their property off the market at the very time when returning veterans
and others needed it most.62 Information is not yet available as to how
many units have actually been put on the market under the stimulus of
this enactment.6 3 Since it is in the federal act, however, the clause
might as well be included in the state legislation, again because of the
legal and political difficulties involved in attempting to bring under
control rents which the federal act expressly decontrolled.
The Minnesota law also contains an exemption copied from an earlier
version of the federal act, but eliminated in conference,"4 of "any ac-
commodations occupied by one individual or one family and with re-
9pect to which a maximum rent established and maintained under au-
thority of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, in
excess of $225 a month was in effect on September 1, 1946." Limita-
tions of this sort have frequently been employed as a means of restrict-
ing rent control to those most in need of it,6" or as a method of decon-
trol,66 but the $225 figure is so high as to be practically meaningless.
The Wisconsin act has picked up from the OPA and Housing Expe-
diter's regulations 67 an exception of "dwelling space occupied by
domestic servants, caretakers, managers, or other employes to whom
the space is provided as part or all of their compensation and who are
employed for the purpose of rendering services in connection with the
premises of which the dwelling space is a part." The New Jersey statute,
in the same words, provides for an administrative exception of such
accommodations. Virginia excepts public housing projects.
Only the Virginia, Wisconsin and Connecticut acts expressly delegate
administrative authority to make further exemptions than those spec-
ified in tle respective statutes. The New Jersey law directs the rent
control commissioner to exempt certain specified classes of housing,"
62. See H. R. REP. No. 317, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1947) (minority views) ; 93
Cong. Rec. 4441, 4448 (April 30, 1947).
63. Landlords claiming exemption under this clause are not required to file any re-
ports with OHE, although they may do so at their option, Controlled Housing Rent
Regulation, § 1(b) (9) (ii), as amended by Amendment 2, 12 FED. REG. 5700 (1947).
64. S. 1017, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1947) ; 93 Cong. Rec. 7439 (June 19, 1947).
65. E.g., Great Britain: Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act,
1920, 10 & 11 GEo. V, c. 17, § 12(2) ; New Zealand: Fair Rents Act of 1936, § 3(1) (c)-
(d) ; Chile: Law No. 6844 (1941) ; Note 50 YALE L. J. 176, 179 (1940).
66. N. Y. Laws 1926, c. 6; 1928, c. 826; Mexico, Decree of Feb. 11, 1946.
67. OPA Rent Regulation for Housing, § 1(b) (2) ; OHE Controlled Housing Rent
Regulation, § 1 (b) (2).
68. Seasonal accommodations, farm housing, and space occupied by service employees.
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but does not clearly authorize him to create further exceptions. The
New York and Illinois acts are ambiguous.c" Administrative exceptions
should be authorized, however, in order to permit decontrol of par-
ticular classes of housing as to which there is no need for regulation.
AREAS COVERED
There is no uniformity among the various acts on the question of
what geographic areas should be subject to control and, specifically,
whether rent control may be extended to areas not under federal control
at the expiration of the federal law. Several alternatives were open to
the legislators, and each of them has been adopted in one or more states.
The Connecticut statute says nothing on the matter, since the whole
state has been subject to federal rent control since July 1, 1942, and
the legislature apparently presumed that the question should be han-
dled on a statewide basis; particular areas can be decontrolled under a
provision to be discussed below. In New Jersey, similarly, the Jaw
provides for rent control boards in every county of the state; not until
after the state act had been extended in April of 1947 was any part of
the state removed from federal control, and then only a single county.
In Virginia, on the other hand, where only certain areas are under the
federal regulations, state rent control can go into effect only in such
areas as the Governor may designate, and it is provided that such areas
must theretofore 70 have been designated by the appropriate federal
agency as areas in which federal controls applied. The Wisconsin law,
as has been observed, is limited to accommodations which were subject
to federal regulation, which renders moot the question of areas, at
least to begin with.7 1 The New York statute, while empowering the
rent commission to bring any part of the state under control, expressly
provides that
"If rent control established pursuant to any federal law is in force
and effect in any area of this state immediately preceding the time
that rent control pursuant to this act shall become operative
therein, the commission shall establish such area as a rent control
area under this act . . ." (italics added).
The Missouri law is similar: all federal defense-rental areas where con-
trol is in effect on the expiration of the federal law automatically come
69. "Any regulation or order under this section ... may provide for such adjust-
ments and reasonable exceptions as in the judgment of the commission are necessary or
proper in order to effectuate the purposes of this act." Sec. 4(4). This language .,:as
taken from the Emergency Price Control Act, supra note 12.
70. Presumably the act means that federal control should have been in effect at the
time the federal legislation expired, and not have been previously terminated.
71. Wis. STAT. § 234.26(2) (b) (Supp. 1947) defines "rent control area" as any area
in which federal controls were operative on the day federal rent regulation terminated.
However, the term is used only in § 234.26(8), which provides for area decontrol.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
under state control, and additional areas can be brought under control
by order of the circuit court or circuit judge on petition of at least ten
qualified voters. The Illinois law, on the other hand, although in most
respects duplicating the New York statute, leaves it up to each com-
munity whether or not to establish rent control or continue federal
control. So does the Maryland law; but, although in one section the
law purports to delegate authority to the mayor and city council of
"every city" and the county commissioners of "every county" in the
state, another section excludes from the operation of the act some
thirteen counties, seven of which were subject to federal controls when
the act was passed-including Prince Georges, a county adjacent to
the District of Columbia and one of the most populous of the state.
The Minnesota act is most ambiguous. At first glance it seems to
follow the New York law, since it defines "defense-rental area" as any
area subject to federal rent control, defines "rent control area", in al-
most the very words of the New York act, as "an area designated by
or pursuant to this act" as an area where rent increases have resulted
or threatened to result, and goes on to provide that all defense-rental
areas in existence on the termination date of federal control shall auto-
matically become rent control areas; but nowhere in the act is anyone
given authority to designate additional areas as rent control areas, unless
it be in the general delegation of authority to the commissioner to
"make rules and regulations necessary in order to effectuate the pur-
poses of this act" in Section 5.
The approach taken by the New York and Missouri statutes is
probably the best. In order to avoid needless confusion and hardship,
all federal rent control areas should automatically continue under state
control until it can be determined whether decontrol is advisable; and
while in all probability control will not be extended to additional areas,
the door should not be shut against such action if it should prove to be
necessary.
AREA DECONTROL
Like the federal act,72 all of the state acts look toward a termination
of control at as'early a date as is practical. In addition to being tempo-
rary in nature, 73 almost all of them contain provisions for decontrol of
particular areas even before the expiration of the entire statutory
scheme.. The New York act provides for decontrol "forthwith" whenever the
rent commission finds that, in any area or portion thereof, the percent-
age of vacancies is 10% or more, or the availability of adequate rental
housing and other relevant factors are such as to make rent control
72. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 204(c), (e).
73. See note 27 supra.
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unnecessary.7 4 In proper cases the commission may reestablish con-
trols in such areas at a later date. The Illinois act has the same pro-
vision, except that the determination is left to the respective commun-
ity housing rent commissions; the Connecticut law is practically iden-
tical, the local boards being granted the final authority. The language
of the New York act is also copied in the Minnesota law, with the ex-
ception of the reference to recontrol; as under the federal law, local
boards may recommend decontrol, but the state Commissioner of Ad-
ministration decides. In Wisconsin, the Governor has authority to
decontrol any area or part thereof if he "finds that a public emergency
no longer exists in respect to" such area or part. In Missouri, the circuit
court or judge, on petition of ten qualified voters, may abolish any rent
control area or diminish its boundaries if it finds "that the demand for
residential housing facilities is not substantially in excess of available
housing facilities." Under the Virginia act, the Governor has authority
to "amend, supplement or revoke" his declarations as to areas subject
to control; but a proviso added in the course of passage empowers "the
local governing body in any political subdivision of any rent control
area" to declare an end to the emergency in such political subdivision.
A similar clause was inserted in the House bill to continue federal rent
control, but was stricken out in conference.7  Certainly there can be
little to recommend such a division of responsibility. The enactment
by the House of the clause referred to drew universal criticism,7° and
the Virginia act is even more inept, in permitting the local governing
body of any small county or city to veto the decision of the chief execu-
tive of the state. Local authorities should have the right to recommend
decontrol of their respective areas, since they are familiar with condi-
tions in the community, but decision should rest with a central author-
ity who can take an over-all view of the picture.
MAx trZI RENTS
Three main methods of rent control have been used in various parts
of the world, either by themselves or in combination: 7 the "freeze"
system, which was employed by the OPA and has been continued under
the Housing and Rent Act of 1947; the "fair rents" system, which was
utilized in New York and the District of Columbia in the 1920's, as well
as in Australia, New Zealand, and elsewhere; 7 and the "percentage"
74. A somewhat similai provision, but inordinately more complicated, vas found in a
model bill drafted by the Citizens' Housing Council, supra note 11; see Note, 50 YALE
L. J. 176, 178 (1940).
75. Willis, s=pra note 1, at 1127.
76. Ibid.
77. See AxmmcAN BAR Ass'x PRocaMrnMas (THE Srcno' oF IT-zn,,ATio:.AL Aim
ComPARATIw LAw) 142-3 (1946).
78. See Willis, "Fair Rents" Systems, 16 GEo. WAsH. L. Ray. 104 (1947).
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system, used chiefly in Latin America. All of these variant methods
may be found in the statutes under consideration.
The easiest course for the legislators to have taken, and probably
the best one, would have been simply to provide for a continuation
of federal ceilings-perhaps with some increase-or to delegate the
whole question to a commission or administrative officer, with an in-
timation that the former ceilings were to be maintained, subject to
adjustment in individual cases. This in fact is what most of the statutes
do. New York, for instance, borrowing the language of the old Emer-
gency Price Control Act, authorizes the state rent commission to "es-
tablish such maximum rent or maximum rents . . . as in the judgment
of the commission will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate
the purposes of this act." "So far as practicable," the commission is
to "ascertain and give due consideration to the rents established pur-
suant to federal law or otherwise prevailing" on or about January 1,
1947.11 If federal rent control is in effect in any area immediately pre-
ceding the time that the state law becomes operative therein, the com-
mission shall "fix maximum rents for housing accommodations therein
.. . in conformity with those in force and effect at such time pursuant
to such federal law." However, maximum rents may be lower than
those "established pursuant to federal law or otherwise prevailing for
the rent control area housing accommodations at the time of the is-
suance of" the regulation or order. While these directions are not en-
tirely consistent, the commission will probably be able to follow them
without much difficulty. The Illinois statute is similar, except that
the rent levels to be considered are those of January 1, 1946,0 and the
local commissions are required to conform to federal ceilings only "as
nearly as may be." Maryland's act authorizes local governing bodies
to continue the existing federal regulations until each such body "may
be able to provide its own regulations and controls," but puts them
under no compulsion to preserve federal ceilings.
The Connecticut, New Jersey and Minnesota statutes automatically
continue the maximum rents under the federal law as ceilings under
the state law, subject to adjustments as provided for.8 In Wisconsin,
the maximum rent after expiration of federal control is the amount
legally chargeable on June 30, 1947,82 under the federal law, plus 15%
79. If, prior or subsequent to January 1, 1947, undue rent increases have resulted or
threatened to result, the date may be moved back not more than one year. An amend-
ment to require rents to be rolled back to January 1, 1947 levels was defeated. 2 N. Y.
Sm. J. 1772 (1947).
80. The draftsmen apparently copied the original New York act. The latter was
amended in 1947 to substitute "January 1, 1947" for "January 1, 1946."
81. The New Jersey act refers to lawful maximum rents on June 1, 1946. As noted
above, the act was passed during the "OPA holiday" of July 1946.
82. The Wisconsin act makes no provision for accommodations first rented after June
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of such amount, and plus an additional 5% as to any tenant who was
in occupancy at any time after June 30 and refused or failed to agree
to a "voluntary" increase up to 15% under the federal Housing and
Rent Act. If the maximum rent at the expiration of the federal law is
more than 115% (or 120%) of the June 30, 1947 rent, such higher
rental shall be permitted. For "permanent" hotel guests, not protected
by the new Federal act, the maximum rent is 125% of the June 30
rate. The Louisiana act would limit rents to (1) 125% of the January,
1940, rent, or (2) 120% of the January, 1942 rent, or (3) the highest
rent legally charged between February, 1942 and June, 1946, whichever
is the highest.8 3 The Indiana bill, as passed by the Senate, would have
required rents to be fixed at not less than 115% of the rentals charged
on the "freeze date" and "not more than a percentage increase of
these rents based upon the percentage of increase in the Cost of Living
Index of the Department of Labor since the freeze date." Where rents
had been adjusted by the federal agency having jurisdiction, the most
recent adjustment would have been considered the rent as of the freeze
date.
84
The Virginia statute takes an entirely different tack. It is a "fair
rent" act, based on a draft prepared by the National Institute of Mu-
nicipal Law Officers in 1941, which was in turn a variation of a bill
drafted by the National Defense Advisory Commission. 3 Briefly, it
provides for the determination by each local board of a "normal rent
date", defined as "the latest date at which rental conditions within
the area or class of dwellings to be regulated had not yet been affected
by the national defense program." The rent paid on the normal rent
date, plus any additional amount which the board may allow by reason
of a general rise in taxes and maintenance or operating costs constitutes
the "normal rent". The normal rent may not be less than 115% of the
rent prevailing for the particular dwelling or for a comparable dwelling
on April 1, 1941. On petition of a landlord or tenant, the board may
determine the "fair and reasonable" rent for a particular dwelling. The
normal rent is prima facie the fair and reasonable rent, but the land-
lord is entitled to "a reasonable return on the fair market value of the
dwelling." Until the fair and reasonable rent is determined, rents are
frozen at the amount charged at the time the law is put into effect.
The board may, however, provide by general order for an adjustment
30, 1947, but almost all such accommodations are exempted from the federal act, see
Willis, supra note 1, at 1120 et seq.
83. La. Acts 1946, No. 333, § 2. See also note 89 infra.
84. Indiana, S.B. 231, as amended, § 9(1) (1947).
85. See note 11 supra; Willis, The Virginia Emergcncy Fair Rent Act of 1947, 33
VA. L. R v. 395 (1947).
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upward of all rents in the area-including those already fixed as "fair
rents"-but not to exceed 15%.5
The Missouri act is a sort of conglomerate of the freeze, the fair rent
and the percentage systems. The maximum rent for "apartments"
rented or offered for rent prior to the effective date of the act is 115%
of the rent on January 1, 1947. If the maximum rent cannot be fixed
under this provision,m it shall not exceed 10% per annum of the reason-
able value of the accommodation, "except that the actual cost of water,
gas, electricity, maid or other service furnished in connection with any
apartment may be added to the maximum rent hereby fixed but this
exception shall not be construed to authorize the addition to such max-
imum rent hereby expended for the repair, redecoration or maintenance
of 'any apartment or building." The reasonable value of an "apart-
ment" is determined by pro-rating the reasonable value of the building
according to relative floor area; s the reasonable value of the building
is the fair market value as of January 1, 1947, plus, if the building was
remodeled, converted or furnished since that date, the actual cost of
the remodeling, converting or furnishing. The Louisiana act is similar
to the Missouri law, in that maximum rents for premises first rented
subsequently to June 30, 1946 (sic) or not previously registered with
OPA are limited to one per cent per month of the cost price or fair ap-
praised value. 9
The approach followed in the states other than these last three is
undoubtedly preferable, particularly in view of the temporary nature
of the statutes. The fair rent system, embodied in the Virginia Act, is
not devoid of merit; 0 but it is too complicated for such a short-term
operation as state rent control in Virginia is likely to be, and, too, Vir-
ginia is essentially a rural state, while effective administration of a
"fair rents" statute calls for a good deal of expertise. The act, more-
86. Section 14 of the Virginia act copies the provision of the New York statute that
"the Board may fix maximum rents for housing accommodations ... in conformity with
those in force and effect at such time pursuant to such federal law," but this is entirely
out of context and without meaning, see Willis, supra note 85, at 408-9.
87. Newly constructed accommodations are exempted from any control.
88. If the building is devoted exclusively to apartments, the reasonable value is ap-
portioned according to the ratio between the area of the apartment and the total floor area
of all apartments in the building. If the building is devoted to. apartments only in part, the
reasonable value is apportioned between residential and other uses according to the rela-
tive floor area. Mo. RPv. STAT. § 3015.4 (Supp.. 1947). The ineptitude of this method of
apportionment seems obvious. Only half of the floor space of basement or attic rooms not
ordinarily used as living quarters is considered floor area. Id., § 3015.1(5).
89. "In the case of furnishings not under OPA rent control" (a meaningless provi-
sion, since furnished accommodations were subject to OPA regulations just as were un-
furnished) charges are limited to 3% per month on the value of the furnishings, La. Acts
1946, No. 333, § 2.
90. See Willis, supra note 78.
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over, contains too many provisions looking toward increases in rents.
The Missouri statute is satisfactory enough insofar as it continues
former ceilings, even with a 15% increase over January 1, 1947 levels,
but the provisions for determination of rents on accommodations not
coming within this clause are scarcely workable.
ADjUSTMENTS
The "freeze" system of rent control necessarily involves provision
for individual adjustments in cases where the frozen rent is, for some
reason, unfair to the landlord or the tenant. The Emergency Price
Control Act recognized this and empowered the Price Administrator
to "provide for such adjustments . . . , as in the judgment of the Ad-
ministrator are necessary or proper in order to effectuate the purposes of
this Act." 91 The OPA did authorize adjustments on ten or a dozen
grounds, but this did not satisfy Congress, and in 1944 the act was
amended to require provision for individual adjustments in cases where
the rent on the freeze date was, due to "peculiar circumstances", sub-
stantially higher or lower than rents generally prevailing in the area,
and where "substantial hardship" had resulted since the maximum
rent date from substantial and unavoidable increases in property taxes
or operating costs.9 2 The adjustment provisions of the OPA regulations
have been continued and expanded by the Housing Expediter under
the new Housing and Rent Act; 93 indeed, the Expediter now author-
izes rent increases on the ground merely that the rent is below compar-
able levels-something which OPA consistently refused to do."4 The
Housing and Rent Act also authorizes increases up to 15% by agree-
ment between landlord and tenant, under certain conditions.05
The necessity for individual adjustments is recognized in all of the
acts which are based on the "freeze" system, except the Wisconsin stat-
91. 56 STAT. 23 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 902(c) (Supp. 1946). The District of Columbia
Emergency Rent Act, 55 STAr. 788 (1941), D. C. CODS § 45-1604 (Supp. 1946), however,
specifies certain limited grounds for adjustments.
92. Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, 5S STAT. 632, 50 U.S.C. §902(c) (Supp.
1946). See Rockcliffe Realty Corp. v. Bowles, 151 F.2d 339 (E.C.A. 1945); Kuskin &
Rotberg, Inc. v. Porter, 153 F.2d 1016 (E.C.A. 1946); Hampshire Holding Corp. v.
Creedon, 161 F.2d 734 (E.C.A. 1947).
93. Controlled Housing Rent Regulation, §5(a) (11), (12), as amended by Amend-
ment 2, 12 FED. RMn. 5700 (1947).
94. Lakemore Co., 1 Pimx & FiscHER AD. LAw 1394 (OPA Op. & Dec. 1942); Equi-
table Trust Co., id. at 1474; Clinton Square Hotel Co., id. at 1484; 315 West 97th Street
Realty Corp., 2 id. at 3045; Weisman & Wiesenthal, 3 id. at 3107; Wascca Realty Corp.,
3 id. at 3320.
Adjustments on this ground were authorized by Honolulu, Ordinance Lo. 941, § 4 (a),
as amended in 1945.
95. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 204(b). Such leases must have been executed
prior to December 31, 1947 and must run through 1948.
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ute, which is entirely self-executing and which, as noted, provides for
automatic increases of 15% or 20% over June 30, 1947 levels. New
York and Illinois follow the language of the Emergency Price Control
Act quoted above. The Connecticut statute provides that the state
rent commission's regulations shall "provide for the making of individ-
ual adjustments in cases in which the maximum rent is substantially
higher or lower than generally prevailing rents in the same municipality
or in which substantial hardship has resulted from increases in property
maintenance, taxes and other costs" and then itself authorizes the local
boards to make upward adjustments of the maximum rents in effect
on the last day of federal control, not in excess of 15%, on substantially
these same grounds. In New Jersey, the county boards are authorized
to make such adjustments, not to exceed 10% of the rent lawfully
charged on June 1, 1946 (sic), as they shall deem just and equitable,
considering changes since January 1, 1942 in taxes, costs of mainten-
ance and operation, the kind, quality and quantity of services fur-
nished, and other relevant factors. The Missouri circuit court may
modify any maximum rents which "because of unusual circumstances
or conditions . ., are grossly inadequate or grossly excessive."
The Minnesota statute is something of a freak. It sets up a state
rent commissioner, but does not in terms authorize him to provide for
adjustments; it sets up local advisory boards, but permits them to
recommend only general percentage increases in maximum rents. But
it authorizes the district court in a fictitious eviction action to adjust
maximum rents where "substantial hardship" exists." Further, it per-
mits increases by agreement between landlord and tenant, up to 15%
of the maximum rent as of February 1, 1947, where the lease is made
with the tenant in possession and is for not less than one year; while
this provision is similar to the one contained in the federal act,9" there
is no pretense that the agreement is voluntary, since if the tenant re-
fuses to agree to the increase the property is freed from rent control.
The landlord and tenant may also agree to an increase in excess of 15%
where "improvements, additional services, facilities or repairs" are in-
volved-a: handy loophole for evasion of maximum rents.
EVICTION CONTROL
Effective rent control inevitably entails restriction on the landlord's
freedom to evict the tenant.98 This has been recognized in the rent
control laws of almost every country in the world, and the statutes
here under consideration are no exception to the rule, although two
96. This provision is substantially identical with the similar subsection of the old
OPA regulations and the OHE regulations. See note 93 suPra.
97. See note 95 sitpra.
98. See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 157 (1921).
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of the states give only lip service to the principle, and take away with
one hand the security of tenure which they give with the other. Thus
in Virginia any tenant may be evicted if ". . . a specific date for the
expiration of the tenancy was provided, and has expired, and the land-
lord has not accepted the payment of rent accruing after such expira-
tion date" or where "under a tenancy from month to month the tenant,
even if not in default, has been given at least ninety days written notice
by the landlord of his intention to terminate the tenancy."-" In Mis-
souri, giving six months' written notice entitles the landlord to evict.
Such provisions vitiate any effectiveness the statutes might otherwise
have.
The New York, Illinois and Maryland statutes merely delegate au-
thority to the agencies charged with the enforcement of rent control
to regulate evictions, as did the Emergency Price Control Act; "-I the
other statutes define the situations in which evictions vill be permitted,
as do the District of Columbia Emergency Rent Act and the Housing
and Rent Act of 1947.11 The Connecticut bill, as introduced, fell into
the first class; subsequently, a section on evictions was inserted in the
bill, but the provision that the local boards should have power to "pre-
scribe conditions, including time limits, under which evictions may be
allowed" was, perhaps inadvertently, left in. The New Jersey act speci-
fies certain grounds for eviction and empowers the state rent commis-
sioner to define others.
The Connecticut act follows the old OPA regulations on eviction al-
most verbatim, so far as grounds for eviction are concerned. The most
significant provisions are those limiting evictions on the ground that
the landlord needs the premises for his own occupancy, to cases where
the landlord owned the property before October 20, 1942 and has an
"immediate compelling necessity" to occupy the premises, or is a vet-
eran. As under the OPA, if the landlord acquired the premises after
that date, he must apply to the local board for a certificate; the board
must find that the purchase was made in good faith and not for the
purpose of circumventing or evading the act. Elsewhere the require-
ments are less rigid. The Minnesota and Virginia statutes-like the
District of Columbia act and the new federal act-permit eviction for
self-occupancy simply on a showing that the landlord seeks in good
faith to recover possession for his immediate and personal use and oc-
cupancy as housing accommodations, regardless of when he acquired
the property. In New Jersey also any owner may evict if he seeks in
99. Va. Laws Spec. Sess. 1947, c. 68, § 11(a) (6), (7).
100. The language of the New York and Illinois acts is identical with the relevant pro-
visions of the former Emergency Price Control Act, as to which see Willis, mipra note 1,
at 1134 n. 123.
101. See id. at 1134 et seq. for discussion of evictions under OPA and under the 1947
act.
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good faith to recover possession for his own use; the tenant is entitled
to six months' notice, unless the landlord is a veteran, in which case
the waiting period is three months. In Missouri a "bona fide owner"
who desires to use or occupy the premises "for purposes other than
rental to others" is entitled to possession on giving ninety days' notice.
The Wisconsin act was intended to supplement the federal act, rather
than merely to take over on its demise, although it may do that as well,
It requires six months' notice where the owner seeks possession for his
own use and ocupancy, and since the federal law leaves the matter of
time limits to state law, this provision is probably valid. But the fur-
ther provision that to qualify as an "owner" the landlord must have
"acquired title (legal or equitable) to the property and [have] made a
bona fide payment of not less than 20 per cent of the purchase price
thereof" 102 stands on shaky ground, as long as the federal act is in
force, for ,the latter was plainly meant to do away with the practice
under the OPA whereby a purchaser could not evict unless, inter alia, he
had paid 20% down. 13 Query, too, as to the proviso that, "Transfer
from other accommodation owned by the owner shall not be deemed
bona fide owner occupancy unless the tenant is offered such accommo-
dation vacated by the owner at a rent proportionately comparable to
the rent of the accommodations covered by the notice." 104
Minnesota and Virginia follow the District of Columbia and federal
acts in allowing eviction where the landlord has contracted to sell the
accommodations to a purchaser for his use and occupancy. Connecti-
cut, Minnesota, Virginia and Wisconsin permit eviction for the purpose
of demolishing the accommodations and replacing them with new con-
struction, as does the new federal act; Wisconsin requires six months'
notice in such cases, even during the life of the federal law. All of the
acts, of course, provide for eviction where the tenant defaults in rent,
violates a substantial obligation of the tenancy, causes a luisance, etc.,
although the language varies. Wisconsin implements the federal act by
making it a violation of a substantial obligation of the tenancy to sublet
102. Any credit extended by or guarantee of credit extended by the Veterans' Admin-
istration under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944 or by the state board of Vet-
erans' Affairs is deemed a bona fide payment. Wis. STAT. § 234.26 (2) (e) (Supp. 1947).
103. Note, too, that the federal act permits a landlord to evict for occupany by a pur-
chaser. Housing and Rent Act of 1947, § 209 (a) (3).
Query whether the definition of "owner," quoted above, text accompanying note 102,
is applicable in construing § 234.26(6) (g), relative to eviction for altering, remodeling or
demolition by the "owner." Sec. 234.26(6) (d), on eviction for owner occupancy, ex-
pressly refers to § 234.26 (2) (e).
104. The validity of these provisions may be upheld, on the theory that the federal act
merely imposes restrictions on the right to evict otherwise existing under state law, and
that the state therefore may further cut down this right. The OPA regulations specifi-
cally provided that eviction might not be effected even under the regulations unless state
law allowed it. Rent Regulation for Housing, § 6(e), 11 FED. REG. 12055 (1946).
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without the landlord's written consent, and by authorizing eviction of a
tenant who "unreasonably interferes with the peaceable possession of
other residents in the same building." New Jersey, Minnesota and
Wisconsin purport to authorize eviction pursuant to a valid and out-
standing "eviction certificate" issued by the federal authorities. Inas-
much as the new federal act abolishes the certificate procedure, how-
ever, these provisions are a dead letter.0 5
ADmINISTRATioN
No two of the acts are the same in their approach to the question of
administration. The New York statute, which was patterned after the
Emergency Price Control Act, delegates broad powers to a "temporary
state housing rent commission," to consist of a single commissioner ap-
pointed by the Governor. The Illinois act provides for "temporary
community housing rent commissions," to consist of one, three, or five
commissioners, as the legislative authority of the particular community
may decide, to be appointed by the chief executive of the city, village,
town or county. Maryland also delegates authority to city and county
governments, and provides that they may create local rent control
commissions or may designate an existing city or county department,
office or agency to exercise such authority. In Connecticut, authority
is divided between an unsalaried state fair rent commission to be ap-
pointed by the Governor in advance of termination of federal controls,
a salaried "coordinator", similarly appointed, who is apparently to be
a sort of executive secretary of the state commission, and unsalaried
local fair rent boards to be named by the local governing bodies. The
commission makes orders and regulations implementing the act, and
the local boards carry out the provisions of the act and the regulations,
subject to review by the commission and by the courts. The New Jer-
sey Act is similar: it sets up a hierarchy of a state rent control commis-
sioner (who is the Commissioner of the Department of Economic Devel-
opment), a state rent control board, consisting of the members of the
Economic Council, and county rent control boards, to consist of the
members of the respective county boards of taxation. The commis-
sioner issues regulations, subject to the approval of the state rent con-
trol board, which also acts in an advisory capacity in the administration
of the act. The county boards pass on petitions for adjustment and
assist in enforcement of the act. In Virginia, the Governor designates
the areas subject to rent control, appoints the local emergency rent
boards, and fixes the compensation of their members, but the boards
operate independently of any control other than through judicial re-
105. This is not entirely true of Wisconsin, since that statute permits eviction under
an outstanding certificate only where the ground for eviction is one set forth in the Hous-
ing and Rent Act of 1947--thus maldng it unnecessary to recommence proceedings ab initio.
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view.0 6 The Minnesota statute is similar to the new federal act in its
division of jurisdiction betveen the Commissioner of Administration
(an existing official) and local boards with purely advisory powers to
recommend decontrol or percentage increases in rents in their respec-
tive areas. 07 In addition, it brings in a third agency in its provision
for "hardship" adjustments by way of fictitious eviction actions in the
district court. Under the Missouri statute, administration is vested in
the circuit courts and circuit judges, which have power to extend,
diminish or abolish rent control areas, and adjust or fix rents. The
Wisconsin act is enterely self-executing, and has no administrative pro-
visions save for the clause authorizing the Governor to decontrol par-
ticular areas or types of housing accommodations.
Except for these last two examples and the Maryland statute, all
of the acts contain provisions for judicial and sometimes administrative
review. The New York statute makes detailed provision for adminis-
trative review of regulations and orders of the state commission by way
of protest proceedings before the commission itself, and for judicial
review in the Supreme Court, the sections being patterned after the
former Emergency Price Control Act. Illinois follows the New York
model with respect to protests, but incorporates its own "Administra-
tive Review Act" for court proceedings. Connecticut provides for re-
view of actions of the local boards, first by filing a protest with the
board, second by appealing to the state commission if the board denies
the protest, and finally by appeal to the Court of Common Pleas. New
Jersey, on the other hand, permits appeal directly to the Court of
Common Pleas from an order of a county board, by-passing the state
commissioner. In Virginia orders of local boards are reviewable by the
circuit or corporation court, since there is no superior administrative
agency; "I in Minnesota, on the other hand, only orders of the com-
missioner are subject to appeal, since the local boards are purely ad-
visory.
0 9
Any administrative plan must be adapted to local conditions and
traditions in the state. Ideally, however, it would seem preferable to
106. Local governing bodies may, however, knock the props out from under the boards
by declaring an end to the emergency in their areas. See p. 365 .supra.
107. While the act provides that "No member shall sit in any case in which he, or any
member of his immediate family, has a direct financial interest" and that "A written deci-
sion, stating briefly the facts and the reasons for the board's* decision, shall be made by
each board in each case," the act in terms gives the local boards no authority except to
recommend decontrol or a general increase in maximum rents in the areas. The boards
cannot pass on individual adjustment cases as can the boards under the federal act.
108. Virginia has an Administrative Procedure Act, VA. CoDE § 580(1)-(8) (Cum.
Supp. 1946) and it is not apparent why this act should not have been incorporated by ref-
erence.
109. Only orders of the commissioner "made pursuant to the provisions of section 4"
are declared to be reviewable. The only orders referred to in § 4 are orders approving or
disapproving recommendations of the local boards. See note 107 mipra.
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have a central authority: 110 either an existing agency, as in Minnesota
and New Jersey, or a new body or officer, as in New York and Connec-
ticut. Some provision for community participation is undoubtedly de-
sirable, although the New York and Wisconsin legislators did not see
fit to make it; but the provision for local boards with merely advisory
powers in the Minnesota statute does not go far enough, while the com-
plete local autonomy granted in the Illinois, Maryland and Virginia
laws goes too far."" The New Jersey and Connecticut schemes offer
a desirable compromise between the two extremes.
112
Judicial review is, of course, essential, but some of the statutes make
it too extensive; the Virginia act, for instance, provides for immediate
court review of rent board determinations of the "normal rent date",
"normal rent", and classification of dwellings subject to control, al-
though these are legislative matters better reviewed in individual
cases."
3
Vesting administrative duties in the courts, as in Minnesota and
Missouri, is not to be commended. The New York rent control laws of
the 1920's left all administrative questions to the courts, and the choice
was not a happy one." 4 The Minnesota and Missouri statutes, how-
ever, do not put as much of a burden on the courts as did the New York
laws.
ENFORCEMENT
One of the deficiencies of the new federal act is its lack of teeth." 5
Most of the state statutes are stronger in this respect, although whether
or not they will be actively enforced is another question.
110. Compare the NDAC and NIMLO model acts, op. cit. 4upra notes 9 and 11.
111. But see the NIMLO draft bill, op. cit. supra note 11.
112. Members of local boards set up under the Housing and Rent Act might well be
appointed to boards provided for in the state law, the more so as they were nominated by
the respective state governors.
113. Va. Laws Spec. Sess. 1947, c. 68, § 10(a). Cf. Willis, supra note 85, at 441.
114. See Linowitz, State Rent Control after T,o World Wars, 19 N.Y. STATa BAn
Ass'N Bu.L. 10 (1947); Testimony of Carl Auerbach, General Counsel of OPA, Hear-
ings before U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Controlling Rent 527-8
(1947). The New York Business and Commercial Rent Laws of 1945 also rely largely
on the courts for their administration, and Governor Dewey has expressed his pleasure
that "the necessity of setting up more bureaus of an administrative kind to regulate eco-
nomic affairs in this field" was avoided, N. Y. LEais. Doc. No. 1 at 14 (1946). See also
Governor Dewey's Memorandum on c. 273 of Laws of 1946, N.Y. STATE LEoxs. Ann. 205
(1946) ('Without the necessity for an expensive rule-making and administrative agency,
the rights of tenants and landlords have been mply protected through the use of the
courts.') However, the Governor has recognized that "It would have been impossible
... to have used the machinery and procedure of commercial rent control with regard
to residential space. Most tenants, poor and rich alike, could find themselves, under such
procedure, involved in legal actions in the courts. Most of them would not have the eco-
nomic strength to maintain their position in such litigation" Memorandum on c. 274 of
Laws of 1946, N. Y. STATE Lzais. AmN. 205 (1946).
115. See Willis, supra note 1, at 1152 ct seq.
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The New York, Illinois and Minnesota acts are copied after the
Emergency Price Control Act, which gave enforcing officials an arsenal
of sanctions. The commissions (commissioner, in Minnesota) may bring
injunction actions, and may certify facts to the district attorneys for
criminal prosecution; they may also intervene in private actions in-
volving the respective acts or any orders, regulations, etc. thereunder.
An overcharged tenant may bring an action for treble damages, or for
an amount not less than $25 nor more than $50, whichever is greater;
if the tenant does not sue within thirty days, or is not entitled to sue,
the commission may bring the action. The Missouri act permits a ten-
ant to sue for treble damages or $25, whichever is the greater; no crim-
inal sanctions are imposed except (upon landlords) for wrongfully de-
priving tenants of necessary services or making apartments uninhabit-
able, and (upon others) for attempting to bribe a landlord to terminate
any existing tenancy subject to the act. New Jersey, on the other hand,
provides only criminal sanctions, although presumably a tenant would
have the right to recover at least the amount of any overcharges. Vir-
ginia permits the local board to sue for double the amount of any over-
charge, half the recovery to go to the tenant and the balance to the
state treasury; whether any criminal penalties may be invoked is not
clear.116 The Connecticut act authorizes injunction actions by the
state commission or local boards; criminal sanctions are also prescribed.
The Wisconsin act in tehms contains no sanctions of any kind, except
for false statements in notices to evict for owner-occupancy or demoli-
tion.'
The New York, Illinois, Connecticut, New Jersey and Virginia acts
authorize the administrative agencies to issue subpoenas and otherwise
to obtain information-a basic necessity which, however, Congress has
denied the Housing Expediter.
CONCLUSION
With the possible exception of the Virginia statute, none of the acts
under discussion constitutes a carefully worked out charter for state
rent control. Most of them are hodge-podges of provisions picked up
from various sources-the Emergency Price Control Act, the Housing
and Rent Act, model statutes and laws of other states. All of them con-
tain defects and loopholes, although this is not always due to any fault
of the draftsmen, for they could not foresee what Congress might do to
federal rent control. Legislators in other states, however, if faced with
the necessity for enacting their own rent controls, will turn to these
statutes for guidance. The foregoing analysis may be of some assist-
ance to them.
116. See Willis, supra note 85, at 426 et seq.
117. *Wis. STAT. § 353.27 (Supp. 1947) provides a penalty of up to one year in jail or a
fine up to $25 for any "offense", the punishment for which is not prescribed by statute, but
this provision wobld not seem to be applicable in the situation under discussion.
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